



# CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The newsletter of the Illinois State Bar Association's Section on Criminal Justice

## People v. Kladis and the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of evidence spoliation by law enforcement

By Mark T. Vazquez

### Introduction

In recent years, law enforcement across the United States has increasingly utilized dashboard-mounted video cameras to record motorists, traffic stops, and sobriety tests.<sup>1</sup> Particularly in Illinois, State Troopers have been required to equip all squad cars with video recording capabilities since 2009.<sup>2</sup> This video can prove to be valuable to both prosecutors and defense attorneys as it provides the most honest account of any police pursuit, traffic stop, or sobriety test; the video, in other words, does not lie. Because of the value of such evidence in criminal litigation, problems arise when police departments

destroy this video before the State has the opportunity to produce it for defense counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court addressed this very spoliation issue in *People v. Marina Kladis*.<sup>3</sup>

### I. Factual Background

In *Kladis*, a Northlake police officer arrested a woman for DUI after she failed a field sobriety test.<sup>4</sup> The arresting officer's dashboard-mounted video camera filmed the incident.<sup>5</sup> Five days after the arrest, defense counsel filed a Notice to Produce requesting a copy of the in-car video.<sup>6</sup> The

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## Case note

### UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION MAY BE USED TO ENHANCE SENTENCE

In *The People ex rel. James W. Glasgow, Petitioner, v. Gerald R. Kinney, Judge, Respondent*, 2012 IL 113197 (May 24, 2012), the defendant, Michael W. Drew, was charged by indictment with Aggravated Driving Under the Influence (DUI), a nonprobationable Class 2 felony. The indictment alleged that on August 7, 2009, defendant committed the charged DUI offense, and that he had three prior DUI violations: (1) a 1985 Will County DUI; (2) a 1990 Cook County DUI; and, (3) a 2000 Bureau County DUI.

Drew ultimately pleaded guilty to Aggravated DUI, as charged in the indictment. However, at the plea hearing, defendant filed a motion *in limine* seeking to "strike" his 2000 Bureau County conviction. Citing *People v. Finley*, 209 Ill.App.3d 968 (1991), defendant argued that his 2000 Bu-

reau County DUI guilty plea was made without legal counsel, and therefore could not be used to enhance his sentence to a nonprobationable Class 2 felony. (In *Finley*, the court held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance a current offense). Alternatively, the State argued that *Finley* was no longer valid because it was based on *Baldasar v. Illinois*, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), and *Baldasar* was later overruled in *Nichols v. United States*, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).

In the end, the court concluded that it was bound to follow *Finley* and granted defendant's motion *in limine*. The court then sentenced defendant to 48 months of probation. The State's subsequent motion to vacate the sentencing order was denied. The State then filed a motion

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## **People v. Kladis and the Illinois Supreme Court's treatment of evidence spoliation by law enforcement**

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defendant contended that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest her and sought to use the video as evidence to impeach the officer's testimony.<sup>7</sup>

Thirty days from the original date of the arrest, on June 3, 2008, the parties convened for the first court date.<sup>8</sup> Defense counsel had yet to receive the video and therefore made an oral motion for discovery requesting the videotape. The State conferred with the officer at this court appearance, confirmed the creation and existence of the video, and consequently agreed to provide the recording.<sup>9</sup> As a result of this agreement, the trial court did not enter an order for production of the video tape.

At the next court appearance on June 17, 2008, however, the State could not produce the video because the police department had already destroyed it; department policy required in-car videos to be recycled every 30 days.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, the defendant moved for discovery sanctions, which the trial court granted.<sup>11</sup> These sanctions barred the officer from testifying as to the events that would have been shown on the video had it not been destroyed.<sup>12</sup>

### **II. Illinois Supreme Court Decision**

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of evidence exclusion as a sanction.<sup>13</sup> Unlike the Appellate Court,<sup>14</sup> the Supreme Court did not discuss whether the evidence spoliation raised Due Process concerns.<sup>15</sup> Instead, the Supreme Court reviewed the discovery sanctions solely in light of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 415(g)(l).<sup>16</sup> Under Rule 415(g)(l), the court had to determine whether a discovery violation occurred, and if so, whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.<sup>17</sup>

#### **In-Car Video is Discoverable in Misdemeanor Cases**

Before the court could decide whether failure to produce the video was a discovery violation, it needed to first determine whether the video was discoverable. The State argued that the video was not discoverable<sup>18</sup> relying on *People v. Schmidt*,<sup>19</sup> which outlined the scope of discovery in misdemeanor criminal cases. In *Schmidt*, the court presented a list of discoverable evidence that the State is required to provide defendants in

misdemeanor cases.<sup>20</sup> These items included: (1) "a list of witnesses," (2) "any confession of the defendant," (3) "evidence negating the defendant's guilt," and, (4) if applicable, "the results of [a] breathalyzer test."<sup>21</sup> Additionally, the court noted that any police report "will be available at trial for use in impeachment of the prosecution witness who prepared it."<sup>22</sup> According to the State, *Schmidt* did not list in-car videos as discoverable; therefore, failing to produce the videos should not be a discovery violation.<sup>23</sup>

The court rejected this argument.<sup>24</sup> The State, according to the court, incorrectly interpreted *Schmidt* as a "rigid list" of what is discoverable.<sup>25</sup> The court noted that it decided *Schmidt* in 1974 and could not possibly have included in-car video as discoverable evidence.<sup>26</sup> Since that time, however, "the use of video recordings as evidence at trial has become a common practice to allow a defendant the opportunity to present an effective defense and to further the truth-seeking process."<sup>27</sup> Given the "importan[ce] and relevan[ce]" of video evidence, the court held that in-car video fell within the scope of misdemeanor discovery.<sup>28</sup> Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that the State's non-compliance with the defendant's production request constituted a discovery violation.<sup>29</sup>

#### **The Sanctions Were Not an Abuse of Discretion**

Additionally, the State argued that even if the failure to produce the video was an available discovery sanction, the sanction was inappropriate, too harsh and therefore amounted to an abuse of discretion. The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected this argument. The court stressed that the trial judge had broad discretion in imposing sanctions.<sup>30</sup> According to the court, the trial judge chose from a "spectrum of available options and narrowly tailor[ed] its sanction to bar . . . testimony regarding what was contained in the video recording."<sup>31</sup> These other available options included questioning the officer about (1) the defendant's driving before she was pulled over, (2) the defendant's behavior after she was placed in the squad car, and (3) the defendant's behavior at the police station.<sup>32</sup> The court concluded that the sanction did not completely prevent the State from presenting a case and, accordingly, the scope

of the sanction was reasonable.<sup>33</sup>

#### **Illinois Legislation Reflects Importance of Video Evidence**

Of note, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on two Illinois statutes in making its decision. First it noted that in 2008, when the General Assembly passed a law requiring State Trooper squad cars to be equipped with cameras,<sup>34</sup> the law required these recordings to be maintained for at least 90 days.<sup>35</sup> While the 2008 statute only applied to State Troopers, the General Assembly passed another law in 2009.<sup>36</sup> This law "established the general rule that when *any* law enforcement agency makes an in-squad video and audio recording . . . that recording shall be retained for a minimum period of 90 days."<sup>37</sup> The 2009 law also required law enforcement to keep any video either made as part of an arrest or deemed evidence until the proceeding reaches a final disposition and an order from the court is issued.<sup>38</sup>

The 2009 law was not in effect at the time the trial sanctions were issued. Nonetheless, the court still found the law reflected the importance of the video evidence. In particular, the court noted that the General Assembly intended "to assist in the truth-seeking process by providing objective evidence of what occurred between the law enforcement officer and the citizen."<sup>39</sup> Thus, given the importance that the legislature placed on such evidence, the court rejected the State's argument that the burdens of producing the videos outweighed the benefits of production.<sup>40</sup>

### **III. Impact**

The holding of *People v. Kladis* is narrow. The decision solely provides that in-car video is discoverable in misdemeanor criminal cases and that a trial court may impose narrowly-tailored sanctions if the State fails to produce it. This does not reflect any significant deviation from the current state of the law. However, the decision does provide judges with precedent to enforce their discovery orders by upholding the discovery sanctions under the stringent abuse-of-discretion standard. In particular, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that in order to overturn the trial court, the imposition of any sanction have to be deemed "fanciful" or "arbitrary."<sup>41</sup>

Despite the narrow holding, the State

most likely feared the broader implications of the decision. Defense counsel could now request that testimony be excluded for every failure to produce video evidence and, unless the ruling is totally baseless, the exclusion will most likely be upheld on appeal. In addition, the case arguably provides defense counsel with a basis to request video evidence created by police lock-up cameras, police parking lot cameras, retail store video surveillance and the like. More importantly, *Kladis* now creates the risk of evidence exclusion if such evidence is destroyed.

### What *Kladis* Means for Defense Attorneys

The usefulness of *Kladis* to defense attorneys should be readily apparent. Defense counsel may now request any in-car video from the State, and the State must either (1) produce the video or (2) face the possibility of sanctions.

The former outcome, actual production of the video, provides the defense attorney with perhaps the most important device a lawyer can have while preparing for trial: information. Frequently the production of the video will expedite a "quick plea" or a plea to a reduced charge. Alternatively, a video may serve as a visual impeachment tool to lock in the officer's testimony. For example, if an officer testifies that the defendant had difficulty exiting his vehicle and had to hold on to the vehicle for support, the video may serve to illustrate that such a conclusion was not justified based upon an examination of the video.

On the other hand, if the video is not produced, the *Kladis* decision allows defense counsel to move for sanctions—a motion referred to by some practitioners as a "*Kladis* motion."<sup>42</sup> This motion, if successful, may result in the exclusion of enough evidence that the case must be dismissed. At a minimum, *Kladis* allows defense counsel to argue that a negative inference be drawn from the fact that the video was destroyed. In order to assure the likelihood of exclusion, counsel should file a motion to preserve the video and serve a subpoena or some form of notice on the party holding the video prior to the video's destruction.

### What *Kladis* Means for Incidentally Recorded Video

In *Kladis*, the video came from the in-car camera of a police cruiser. Therefore, the video had been made for the express purpose of aiding law enforcement or serving as evidence in a criminal trial. What remains to be seen, however, is whether sanctions could be

imposed on the State for destroying video that was incidentally recorded or video recordings that were not specifically intended for that particular defendant, but rather for general security purposes.

For example, the police department may possess video in its possession that filmed a criminal defendant on security cameras in its parking lot or in the hallways of the police station or lock-up area. This video serves primarily a security purpose, so unlike in-car video, its evidentiary value may not be immediately apparent to the police. Further, this video does not fall under the same Illinois statute analyzed in *Kladis* that requires law enforcement to preserve it for 90 days.<sup>43</sup> Assuming counsel can show that the defendant was actually recorded by the incidental video, *Kladis* arguably allows for exclusion if the State fails to produce the evidence.

While all sanctions will ultimately depend on an *ad hoc* analysis of the specific case, *Kladis* does not give trial judges carte blanche to impose sanctions anytime the State unintentionally fails to preserve video evidence. Central to the basis of the sanctions in *Kladis* were the issues of knowledge and notice. The State knew that a video was created from the camera mounted on the police vehicle and was on notice from the defense to produce it. Where cameras record an event incidentally, the State will not have the initial awareness of the video's existence. Thus, absent a specific request from the defense for the security tape, the State will not know of the existence of the video or be on notice to preserve it. Accordingly, whether exclusion will be appropriate in such a case will depend on a balancing test. In this regard, the court will weigh the egregiousness of the State's failure to act given adequate notice against the probative value of the video.

### What *Kladis* Means for Privately Recorded Video

Additionally, *Kladis* may have implications for the spoliation of privately recorded videos. For example, a defendant may move for the production of a security tape recorded by a third-party on private property, such as a store parking lot. Assuming the trial judge orders the State to produce the video and the video is destroyed after issuance of the order, *Kladis* says that it would likely not be an abuse of discretion to issue sanctions in that situation.

Of course, the presence of a third-party complicates matters. The State must now act quickly to ensure a third-party—as opposed

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to the police—does not destroy the video. The police have a statutory duty to preserve the video and regularly work in conjunction with State prosecutors; most private third-parties do not. This situation is more likely to occur in a typical retail theft case where a video was taken and referred to in a police report, but the police and the Assistant State's Attorney are not yet in possession of the DVD. In these types of cases, the probative value of the video is substantial. Therefore, in balancing the competing interests, while any State wrongdoing may potentially be less egregious, the need for the evidence could still make exclusion an appropriate remedy.

In these types of cases, defense counsel should move for the preservation of the video when it becomes known that neither the prosecutor nor the police are in actual possession of the video. Counsel should then serve the resulting court order upon the retail establishment with a subpoena requesting items be produced in court. If the evidence is not produced or destroyed the defendant may request exclusion.

#### IV. Conclusion

Evidence spoliation stands as a significant obstacle to the truth-seeking function of the courts. These concerns are heightened by the criminal setting and by the relevance of the evidence destroyed. The *Kladis* opinion addressed these concerns and recognizes that trial judges should have significant freedom to impose sanctions to deter such spoliation when it occurs. ■

*Editor's note: For more information about the Kladis case, see the May 2012 issue of the Illinois Bar Journal, <<http://www.isba.org/ibj/2012/05/missingvideoevidenceinduicasesafter>>.*

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1. See Bob Sullivan, *Squad Cars Go Digital: IBM Enters Crowded Market for Cop-Cams*, MSNBC (May 17, 2010), <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078632>> ("nearly half" of all squad cars in the United States are equipped with video cameras); see also generally Jess Maghan, Gregory W. O'Reilly, & Phillip Chong Ho Shon, *Technology, Policing, and Implications of In-Car Videos*, 5 Police Q., No. 1 25 (March 2002) (detailing the trend towards the use of in-car video by the Chicago Police Department and the departments of neighboring suburbs).

2. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2610/30(b) (2011) ("By June 1, 2009, the Department [of State Police] shall install in-car video camera recording equip-

ment in all patrol vehicles.").

3. 960 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011).

4. *Id.* at 1105.

5. *Id.* at 1106.

6. *Id.*

7. *Id.*

8. *Id.*

9. *Id.*

10. *Id.* at 1106–07.

11. *Id.* at 1107.

12. *Id.* ("According to [the officer], the tape would have captured the following: images of defendant's car five seconds prior to the stop; the manner in which defendant pulled over and curbed her vehicle; defendant's actions when he approached her vehicle; the manner in which defendant opened her car door and exited her vehicle; and defendant's performance of the field sobriety tests.").

13. *Id.* at 1106.

14. The Appellate Court thoroughly discussed the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the "area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence" before ultimately concluding that it was unnecessary to decide whether the violation constituted a violation of due process. *People v. Kladis*, 934 N.E.2d 58, 63–65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).

15. See generally *People v. Kladis*, 960 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. 2011).

16. *Id.* at 1109–14. The Rule provides that,

[i]f at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, exclude such evidence, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circum-

stances.

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 415(g)(l).

17. *Kladis*, 960 N.E.2d 1109, 1112.

18. *Id.* at 1109.

19. 309 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1974).

20. *Id.* at 558.

21. *Id.*

22. *Id.*

23. *Id.* at 1109.

24. *Id.* at 1110.

25. *Id.*

26. *Id.*

27. *Id.*

28. *Id.* at 1111.

29. *Id.*

30. *Id.* at 1113.

31. *Id.*

32. *Id.*

33. *Id.*

34. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2610/30(f).

35. *Kladis*, 960 N.E.2d at 1111.

36. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h-15).

37. *Kladis*, 960 N.E.2d at 1111 (emphasis added).

38. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h-15).

39. *Kladis*, 960 N.E.2d at 1111.

40. See *id.* at 1111–12.

41. *Id.*

42. See, e.g., Sarah Manning, *Missing Video Issues in Prosecution for DUI with Illinois State Police*, DUI Chicago Blog (Feb 16, 2012, 4:08 PM), <<http://www.duichicago.com/blog-0/bid/118236/Missing-Video-Issues-in-Prosecution-for-DUI-with-Illinois-State-Police>>.

43. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-3(h)–(h-15) (including within the statute: (1) recordings made by the in-car camera of a squad car; (2) recordings made of the occupant of a squad car; and (3) recordings made during the use of a weapon or device where the weapon or device is equipped with a camera).



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## Case note

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with the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to file a complaint seeking *mandamus* relief. The State argued that the order the trial court entered, striking defendant's uncounseled conviction, must be vacated and that defendant thus required resentencing for the nonprobationable felony to which he pleaded guilty.

In reaching its decision to award the *mandamus* relief requested by the State, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned as follows: In *Scott v. Illinois*, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor has no constitutional right to counsel when no sentence of imprisonment is imposed. A year after the *Scott* decision, a majority of the Court held in *Baldasar* that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, while constitutional under *Scott*, could not be collaterally used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor conviction into a felony under the applicable Illinois sentencing-enhancement statute.

Subsequently, in *Nichols*, the Supreme

Court continued its adherence to *Scott*, but overruled *Baldasar*. It then adopted the *Baldasar* dissent, holding that an uncounseled conviction that is valid under *Scott* may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense. The *Nichols* court reasoned:

Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal history provisions \*\*\* or recidivist statutes that are commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.

*Nichols*, 511 U.S. 747.

Moreover, *Nichols* held "an uncounseled conviction valid under *Scott* may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, *even though that sentence entails imprisonment.*" (Emphasis added). *Nichols*, 511 U.S. 746 - 47.


In reaching its ultimate decision in the instant cause, Illinois Supreme Court added that the United States Supreme Court has consistently sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense commit-

ted by the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court also opined that *Nichols* plainly held "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under *Scott* because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction." *Nichols*, 511 U.S. 749.

In accordance with *Nichols*, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that a valid, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is also valid when used to enhance punishment in a subsequent conviction. As a result, the Court awarded *mandamus* and ordered the Respondent Judge to: (1) vacate his order granting the motion of defendant, Michael W. Drew, to "strike" his Bureau County DUI conviction; (2) vacate his sentencing order; (3) deny defendant's motion to strike; and, (4) sentence defendant in accord with the Aggravated DUI, nonprobationable Class 2 felony charge to which he pleaded guilty.

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**Friday, 9/7/12- Teleseminar**—Valuing Closing Held Interests and Effective Planning without Discounts. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Monday, 9/10/12- Webinar**—Introduction to Legal Research on FastCase. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association- Complimentary Training and CLE Credit for ISBA Members Only. 2:30-3:30.

**Monday, 9/10/12- Friday, 9/14/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—40 Hour Mediation/Arbitration Training. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 8:30-5:45 daily.

**Wednesday, 9/12/12- Webinar**—Advanced Tips for Enhanced Legal Research on FastCase. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association- Complimentary Training and CLE Credit for ISBA Members Only. 2:30-3:30.

**Thursday, 9/13/12-Saturday, 9/15/12- Itasca, Westin Hotel**—8th Annual Solo and Small Firm Conference. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. Time TBD.

**Tuesday, 9/18/12- Teleseminar**—Ethics in Pre-Trial Investigations. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Thursday, 9/20/12- Teleseminar**—Tax Planning for the Entrepreneur. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Thursday, 9/20/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office (DNP)**—Introduction to Improvisation for Lawyers: Basic Communication Skills for Public Speaking, Teaching and Presenting. Complimentary for ISBA Law Ed Faculty. 9-11; 12-2; 2:30-4:30.

**Friday, 9/21/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—Introduction to Impro-

visation for Lawyers: Basic Communication Skills for Attorneys. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 9-11; 12-2; 2:30-4:30.

**Monday, 9/24/12- Webinar**—Fastcase Boolean (Keyword) Search for Lawyers. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association- Complimentary Training and CLE Credit for ISBA Members Only. 2:30-3:30.

**Tuesday, 9/25/12- Teleseminar**—Individual Trustees-Duties and Potential Traps. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Thursday, 9/27/12- Teleseminar**—Breaking Up: Ethical Considerations When a Law Firm Dissolves. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Friday, 9/28/12- East Peoria, Stoney Creek Inn**—Deconstructing Delinquency. Presented by the ISBA Child Law Section. 8:00-4:45.

**Friday, 9/28/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—The Basics of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Presented by the ISBA Standing Committee on Disability Law. 9:15-12:45.

**Friday, 9/28/12- Live Webcast**—The Basics of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Presented by the ISBA Standing Committee on Disability Law. 9:15-12:45.

### October

**Tuesday, 10/2/12- Teleseminar**—Compensation Issues in Nonprofits. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Monday, 10/8/12- Webinar**—Introduction to Legal Research on FastCase. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association- Complimentary Training and CLE Credit for ISBA Members Only. 9-10.

**Monday, 10/8/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—Advanced Workers' Compensation- Fall 2012. Presented by the ISBA Workers' Compensation Law Section. 9-4.

**Monday, 10/8/12- Fairview Heights, Four Points Sheraton**—Advanced Workers' Compensation- Fall 2012. Presented by the ISBA Workers' Compensation Law Section. 9-4.

**Tuesday, 10/9/12- Teleseminar**—Franchise Agreements: A Practical Guide to Reviewing and Negotiating. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Wednesday, 10/10/12- Webinar**—Advanced Tips for Enhanced Legal Research on FastCase. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association- Complimentary Training and CLE Credit for ISBA Members Only. 9-10.

**Wednesday, 10/10/12- Thursday, 10/11/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—A Primer on Administrative Law and Rulemaking. Presented by the ISBA Administrative Law Section; co-sponsored by the ISBA Civil Practice and Procedure Section, the ISBA Real Estate Law Section and the ISBA Energy, Utilities, Transportation and Telecommunications Section. All day both days.

**Friday, 10/12/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—Transitions, Economics and Ethics- Ready or Not! Presented by the ISBA Senior Lawyers Section. Half Day PM program.

**Friday, 10/12/12- Bloomington, Holiday Inn and Suites**—Fall 2012 DUI & Traffic Law Updates. Presented by the ISBA Traffic Laws and Courts Section. 9-4.

**Tuesday, 10/16/12- Teleseminar**—Understanding Financial Statements for Business Lawyers, Part 1. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Wednesday, 10/17/12- Teleseminar**—Understanding Financial Statements for Business Lawyers, Part 2. Presented by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.

**Wednesday, 10/17/12- Chicago, ISBA Chicago Regional Office**—What Every Lawyer Should Know About Intellectual Property. Presented by the ISBA Intellectual Property Law Section. All day program. ■

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